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Felipe Alou: Is He Afraid of the Walk?

November 13, 2002 - dlf

There are several roles for a manager. Tango's piece above focus on the teaching end of the job.

I would suggest that a much larger role for the manager is in selecting who is on the team and assigning roles to those players. As such, I think that Alou's club's walk totals are more telling than looking at a handful of players.

In 2000, the Expos were last in the NL with 476 walks. The NL average, excluding Montreal, was a bit over 617.

In 1999, Montreal again was last in walks with 438 with a non-MON average of just under 611.

In 1998, Montreal was 15th of 16 clubs totaling 439 BBs in a league averaging 551.

In 1997, the Expos were back to last (out of 14 clubs now) with 420 walks where the league averaged 560.

In 1996, the Expos were 13th of 14 clubs with 492 BBs while the NL averaged ~539.

Alou left Montreal during the 2001 season. I don't have before and after numbers within the season, but is it coincidence that the club climbed 3 spots (13th) in league BBs that year? Or up to 8th in the first full season without him at the helm? I don't know and I don't think anyone can definitively say.

But I sure would think that the evidence suggests that he certainly doesn't strongly preach plate patience.

Advances in Sabermetrics (August 18, 2003)

Posted 12:12 p.m., August 19, 2003 (#8) - dlf
  Regression to the mean is certainly not a new advance in sabermetrics. I don't know who first identified the concept, but would suggest John McGraw's willingness to trade players after their big seasons was the same information presented in a less structured format. Bill James was writing about regression 20 years ago calling it the "plexiglass principle" and applied it to both teams and individuals.

Same with fluke years. Four decades ago, we talked about the '61 season of Norm Cash as a fluke, just as newer followers of the game did with Brady Anderson's 50 taters.

I think of things like DIPS, Woolner's Catcher ERA study, zone based defensive analysis such as ZR and UZR, as being significant changes. Arguably, measuring run production & prevention against team performance ala Win Shares is a significant change in direction, but I'm not sure the state of the art will follow that lead or will continue to try to isolate individual performance apart from team influence.

I expect the next step to be somewhere along the lines of the A's attempts at medical review of pitcher mechanics. I also doubt that the information will be divulged at the level (both quantitatively and qualitatively) we amatuers can participate in and move the knowledge forward.

Advances in Sabermetrics (August 18, 2003)

Posted 3:30 p.m., August 19, 2003 (#14) - dlf
  Well, obviously Johnny Walker Black regresses much more to the mean than does Johnny Walker Blue and clearly Johnny Walker Red is the inferior performer to both.

OK, leaving the Harry Caray liquid diet plan.

Tangotiger, I can't answer your question. There is a formula (or series of formulae?) which can describe the mathematical concept of regressing to a population mean where that mean and the standard deviation therefrom is known, there is an observed sample such as in the example you set out. I don't know it and am unwilling to dig through college text books that have been gathering dust since Fernando Valenzuela was the best pitcher in baseball (or to carry the original idiom forward, since well before my most recent bottle of Glenlivet purple was laid down in oaken casks.) But the concept of regression as it applies to baseball players and teams is not new.

I don't discount the importance of regression. Rather I point out that it has been observed and intuitively understood for generations. Further, the saber-community has used it for decades, including James' "Plexiglass Principle" applied to teams. Also, the Brock2 system released in 1985 used a series of interlocking formulae to shape a player's projection based both on that player's own performance AND on league-wide norms. I'm willing to bet that James wasn't the first to publish articles or books which implicitly or explicity account for regression; just those two are the first examples that pop into my head.

2003 Park Factors (October 1, 2003)

Posted 4:43 p.m., October 2, 2003 (#13) - dlf
  Bob, Not that it affects the larger point, but the first few years for the Rockies were played in old Mile High Stadium, not Coors Field.

Injury-prone players (October 14, 2003)

Posted 3:36 p.m., October 14, 2003 (#7) - dlf
  Do a matched-pair study. That is, you have 2 groups that are equals in terms of:
- age
- position
- body type
- performance level

I suspect that adding "performance level" would cause introduce serious flaws into the study. Even using rate stats rather than cumulative performance, I would suspect that of any two players with identical "true talent" the player who historically been injured more injury would be less likely to actually perform as well.

Injury-prone players (October 14, 2003)

Posted 4:12 p.m., October 14, 2003 (#9) - dlf
  Tom,

I'm not explaining myself well. What you are trying to do is find sets of matched players who are identical in everything EXCEPT how injury prone they are. However, by introducing performance into the twining definition, I suspect that you have a dependant variable in the matching sets. I don't think it is just a question of sample size that needs to be overcome - rather when not on the DL, the injury prone player is less likely to be at 100% than is the non-injury prone one. I tend to think that the talent difference between injury prone Bob Horner and non injury prone Mike Schmidt was much smaller than the observed difference in their respective rate stats.

Fun with Win Shares (November 5, 2003)

Posted 4:55 p.m., November 5, 2003 (#2) - dlf
  Great stuff Pete and Studes!

ALCS Game 7 - MGL on Pedro and Little (November 5, 2003)

Posted 4:52 p.m., November 5, 2003 (#2) - dlf
  Two things:

1. Without biting off all of RossCW's comment regarding the prevalency of particular attitudes among sabermetric followers ... MGL's post reads as if there is no place for subjective observation of actual performance. While I think that too much emphasis can be placed on outcome rather than process in determining good/bad decisions, I think ignoring outcome takes the exercise out of the real world and limits its applicability to the sterile laboratory where computers simulate everything.

2. Maybe it wasn't "obvious," but watching the game, I felt Pedro was done after reaching back for more to get Soriano in the 7th. Like the other poster on the fanhome thread, I thought Pedro's demeanor was that of a tightrope walker asked to cross the ledge one time too many. Also informing my view is Pedro's history of poorer performance with higher pitch counts, his frequent bouts of mild injury, and his slender physique. This becomes retrospective, but his inability to "put away" batters with two strikes is also indicative of a loss of "stuff." MGL's emphasis in his post on pitch speed seemed to miss the point. It isn't how hard the ball is thrown, but rather a combination of speed, movement and location. I would suggest that for all but the most exceptional of fans, the best way to evaluate those collectively is what is the result (over multiple iterations). Here, obviously, the results were poor.

ALCS Game 7 - MGL on Pedro and Little (November 5, 2003)

Posted 9:25 a.m., November 7, 2003 (#17) - dlf
  I understand why we would want to look at an entire career rather than a tiny slice of it. But here, there is a clear reason to look at 2001 and forward: in 2001, Pedro was injured and missed half a season. In the two years after that, he has averaged about 15% fewer IP per year than he did in the five years leading up to the injury. While still a great, great pitcher, he has "obviously" exhibited less durability within a season. I would respectfully suggest that it is equally apparent that he has shown less durability within a particular game and, thus, the 100+ pitch numbers from earlier should be given much less weight than those more recent ones.

Tango, without looking at numbers, I am hard pressed to think of very slender hard throwers at even remotely the same level of ability as Martinez. Ron Guidry and Bret Saberhagen both exhibited severe on/off seasons perhaps related to overwork, but I don't know if they showed the same in game deterioration as observed in Martinez. Perhaps Pedro's big brother Ramon. Roy Oswalt? There are many more relievers who would broadly fit into the group (Billy Wagner, Mariano Rivera, Tom Gordon) but obviously those help none at all in trying to measure post 100 pitch effectiveness.

But I wonder if you are making a fundamental error assuming that most (any?) change in BABIP is primarily luck. Yes, there is little difference between MLB pitchers in $H, but I haven't seen a study that says the same holds true at lower levels (minors, college, Japan, etc.) It could very well be that as a pitcher tires, his ability to prevent hits on balls in play compared to the general population decreases at a different rate than his ability to get Ks or prevent BBs. What evidence do you have to suggest that $H is consistent from pitch 1 to pitch 115?

Golf - player of the year (November 10, 2003)

Posted 5:43 p.m., November 10, 2003 (#1) - dlf
  In baseball, MVP, Cy Young, etc. specifically exclude postseason performance. The equivilent in golf has to be the Majors. I would suspect that Player of the Year voters give more weight to performance in the Masters or British Open than they do to the Greater Hartford Open.

The Problem With "Total Clutch" Hitting Statistics (December 1, 2003)

Posted 3:40 p.m., December 2, 2003 (#24) - dlf
  Is anyone here familiar with a study of clutch pitching? It seems that as the initiator of action, a pitcher could (should?) be more affected by heart / desire / character / balls or whatever cliche you want to use. But of all the hundreds of studies of clutch performance that I've seen, each and every one has looked at hitters rather than pitchers. I don't mean to suggest that Mariano Rivera is necessarily "clutch," but because of the physical and psychological differences in duties, I think it silly to suggest that evidence that Derek Jeter lacks a discernable ability to consistently outperform his norms in clutch situations requires us to believe the same is true of Rivera.

Building the 2004 Expos (December 8, 2003)

Posted 6:08 p.m., December 8, 2003 (#3) - dlf
  David,

I wish I shared your optismistic faith in human endeavors. But my cynical side suggests that this team owned by and controlled by its competitors has mandated that the Expos not offer arbitration to Guerrero (1) in order to hold down the cost to whomever finally acquires him and (2) so they don't have to pay the going cost of drafting a first rounder plus a sandwitch choice. In other words, it was a decision made for the financial benefit of every other team and in no way based on what is good for either the Expos, their fans, or Guerrero himself.

Correlation between Baserunning and Basestealing (December 10, 2003)

Posted 12:55 p.m., December 10, 2003 (#4) - dlf
  Presumably, the fast runners of today were as fast then, and therefore, we shouldn't expect more than +/- 5 runs added on baserunning back them.

I can think of several reasons why this MAY not be true:

1. Artificial turf. All other things being equal, it is easier to go from 1st to 3rd on a single if running on the plastic. There has been a dramatic decrease in the number of turf parks since the Rickey / Raines / Coleman heyday. I would guess that the change has decreased both attempts and success rates. On the defensive side, a ball right at a fielder gets to him quicker on plastic, decreasing attempts and rates, but a ball to either side is more likely to get by increasing those attempts and rates. I have no earthly idea how to figure the change from that.

2. With fewer homers and lower overall scores, there was a perception that the benefit of advancing the extra base was higher and the risk of being thrown out lower. I would posit that runners were making the attempt more often but getting thrown out a higher percentage of times. Depending on the exact changes in attempts and success ratio, that could either push up or push down the +/- 5 runs estimate.

3. It seems that there is a greater emphasis on offensive skill versus defensive ones now than during the era from Maury Wills and Lou Brock through Omar Moreno and Ron LeFlore to Vince Coleman and Kenny Lofton. I can't prove this, but I think outfield arms have declined in accuracy and baseball relevant strength. I can't think of any current player who would fit nicely with Dewey Evans, Jesse Barfield, Dave Parker or others. (And yes, I see the irony of having listed noodle armed Brock & Moreno as playing in an era with better OF arms.)

I guess I don't really see a way of realistically taking the +/-5 from 2000-02 into the 1970s and 1980s let alone 1890s through 1910s.

Diamond Mind Baseball - Gold Glove Winners (December 11, 2003)

Posted 9:33 a.m., December 12, 2003 (#12) - dlf
  MGL,

1. If you plunge into never ending italics or bold or another odd typeface, in the next thread, open the italics and then close it TWICE. (i) something (/i) (/i) obviously replacing the parenthesis with the less than and greater than signs.

2. You seem to suggest that PBP should completely replace any DRA, DFT, Def Win Shares analysis. I disagree. Unless and until we get to the point where all potential biases (park, pitching, opponents, defensive positioning, etc.) are removed, I believe they should complement one another. I understand that you attempt to adjust for most such biases in UZR, but until we KNOW that all are absolutely and correctly adjusted we should look at a multitude of data, PBP and non-PBP. That you continue to tinker with the method leads me to believe that we haven't gotten to that point yet.

3. Why shouldn't a pitcher's ability to control the running game be considered part of his fielding? It is for a catcher. I would hazard to guess that because of the number of potential runners versus the number of BIP in his zone of responsibility, of the non-pitching part of his defense, it could easily have the largest affect. That, in part, is why I've always thought the annual choice of Greg Maddux as Gold Glove recipient was incorrect. Maddux, for all his greatness, couldn't keep Mo Vaugh, while carrying David Wells and Calvin Pickering on his back, from stealing second.

4. You state "When giving yearly awards, you don't care if a player's one-year performance was luck or skill." I agree. However, I would suggest that using UZR to determine Gold Gloves could fall into that same trap. It is my understanding that many of the adjustments (park factors particularly) are based on multi-year data. And to determine whose talent is better, that is clearly the correct choice. But if trying to decide who was better retrospectively, I don't think it relevant if a park is playing abnormally in a particular year. (Unrelated to this point, but also a problem of using UZR to select GG is your practice of placing all players into the same context regarding number of opportunities. If the norm is 80%, Joe makes 9 of 10 plays, and Bob makes 17 of 20, Bob has helped his team more and in my opinion is more deserving of the GG regardless of a reasonable expectation that next year Joe will be better. That, obviously, is a question regarding the manner you present data rather than the underlying data itself.)

5. You seem to mock the idea of actual observation of performance. I disagree. I think that it is silly to say, as do many fans and sports writers, 'I saw Fred make great plays, therefore he must be a great fielder.' However, that is different that using systemic observation of many (all?) players for many (all?) plays. It is my understanding that PBP data puts all BIP into three categories, grounder, line drive and fly ball. It is my understanding that PBP data doesn't make indication for defensive positioning. If a fielder's reputation is out of line with PBP data, it is most likely that the reputation is wrong; however, that does not eliminate the possibility that the team has an odd positioning, an unusual number of borderline flys/liners or something else not picked up in the raw data. In analyzing the decision to take Pedro Martinez out of ALCS game 7, you closely reviewed (video? digital?) tapes of actual pitches to observe speed and location (and movement?). That is absolutely appropriate. I would suggest similar observation is relevant and appropriate to determining fielding prowess.

Diamond Mind Baseball - Gold Glove Winners (December 11, 2003)

Posted 9:36 a.m., December 12, 2003 (#13) - dlf
  Jeeze, half of what I just wrote, Tango posted a few minutes earlier and much more concisely. I need to learn to either type faster or hit refresh before I submit a comment.

Diamond Mind Baseball - Gold Glove Winners (December 11, 2003)

Posted 2:19 p.m., December 12, 2003 (#20) - dlf
  Tango,

Thanks!

MGL,

My sympathies for your loss. While I anxiously look forward to your response to the issues raised by Tango, J.Cross, ColinM and myself, I can appreciate a slight change in priorities at the time of a family member's death.

ARod and Soriano - Was the Trade Fair? (February 16, 2004)

Posted 11:08 a.m., February 17, 2004 (#15) - dlf
  Note that what the market thinks of a player is not necessarily what he is actually worth. The market is only right if it can properly balance all known information.

And the parties all act without outside constraints. Because of the unilateral negotiating rights for years 0-2, arbitration from 3-5 and FA only from 6 forward, the market, by definition, can not accurately balance actual player value. At best the FA market can only determine the value of a particular subset of players.

And because of wild swings in supply the resulting price from year to year can also change dramatically. Its easy to say that Player X and Player Y both create Z wins, both should get A dollars. But if Player X comes on the market with Players X1, X2 ... X20 all of whom create roughly the same number of wins, while Player Y comes on the market the next year when fewer similar players are available, obvioulsy Y will get more.

And when we are talking about A-Rod, there can be no real market established. He is a unique performer whose financial situation is and should be similarly unique. A Formula One racing car goes about 20% faster than a street Porsche. But the former is unique, the latter is not. You can't use the Porsche plus 20% as a fair market value for the racer. In my daughter's bedroom there is a poster of Britney Spears (god have mercy on me!), on my office wall, there is an original piece of artwork by a semi-famous artist. Because of scarcity and low turnover, it is much, much easier to establish the value of the poster than the painting.

Long and short of it is I think we can easily establish the on-field value of the performance of A-Rod and Soriano. I think we can make reasonable projections of their future performances and how that will impact their clubs. But trying to say who got the better end of the deal financially? We simply lack most of the necessary data and are making wild speculative guesses.

ARod and Soriano - Was the Trade Fair? (February 16, 2004)

Posted 1:04 p.m., February 17, 2004 (#19) - dlf
  Tango,

I said that Rodriguez is unique. You said no, he's just 20 runs better than the next best non-Bonds player. That assumes that those 20 runs are identical to any other 20 runs. That is an assumption that teams (with literally hundreds of millions of dollars at stake being run by folks who made billions in the U.S. and Canada marketplaces) don't make. You assume as a default option, team and league level stupidity based on some very shaky and quite limited financial information. 2+2=1+3. But that mathematical certainly may be far from a baseball or financial certainty.

Likewise, I think it incredibly naive to suggest that a player is paid solely based on offense+defense. Particularly a player like A-Rod. Based on published reports, Boras, during negotiations with the Red Sox, suggested that use of the logo *for A-Rod* was worth $7m per year. Turn it around - how much is the use of A-Rod *in the logo* worth to a team? A-Rod may be, in the batter's box, roughly equivilent to Manny Ramirez. Tell that to Radio Shack, Nike, or the folks putting on the innovative MLB adds.

Will the Dodgers on field operation be run better by DePodesta than it was by Malone and Evans? I would bet on it. The advances Sabermetrics can bring on the field are profound indeed. But in five years, Murdoch's group realized a $120m appreciation ($311 purchase price $430 sales price) in its asset from 1998 to its sale this spring. Are you telling me that they did that "while business practices get thrown out the window"? This ain't just a quaint little hobby for the independently wealthy - a hundred million here, a hundred million there ...

ARod and Soriano - Was the Trade Fair? (February 16, 2004)

Posted 2:18 p.m., February 18, 2004 (#32) - dlf
  Which players drawing power would be less than expected by their baseball value? There have to be some.

I would suggest that the player right at the top of the list in baseball value, would be near the top of the list in negative difference between such value and drawing power - Barry Bonds. No doubt that he is a GREAT player. But his contentious relationship with the media has fairly or not resulted in an image of a surly aloof player unloved by many fans. His lack of major endorsements speaks both to his own goals and the image Wall Street / Hollywood have of him. To a greater or lesser degree, quite a number of players like Pedro Martinez, Randy Johnson, Manny Ramirez, Frank Thomas, or other contentious personalities have similar effects. (A digression on the impact of race on "drawability" would be interesting, but beyond the scope of my abilities or knowledge.)

Likewise, there are many quiet players who shun media attention. Edgar Martinez or Bernie Williams appear to be on the down side of their careers, but I think their on-field performance has been significantly more valuable than what they are off-field.

The Scouting Report, By the Fans, For the Fans - 1B Report (March 24, 2004)

Posted 3:42 p.m., March 24, 2004 (#3) - dlf
  MGL's excellent defensive metrics (UZR, arm, dp) seem to miss two skills of 1Bs: the "scooping" ability and the 3-6-3 / 3-6-1 double plays. I don't know how much impact either would have on a complete evaluation. But the fan's vote has 4 categories (hands, release, strength, and accuracy) that are not directly reflected in UZR. It should be no surprise that those four categories show the lowest correlation to UZR.

The Scouting Report, By the Fans, For the Fans - 1B Report (March 24, 2004)

Posted 6:27 p.m., March 24, 2004 (#7) - dlf
  MGL, Thanks for the clarification. The data is presented in your charts, but not in Tango's summary here.

Is there a source for GIDP started by the 1B somewhere on the web? If not, can someone suggest a good book that includes that data? Anecdotally, it seems like guys like a Don Mattingly who played off the line and had a decent arm started many, many more 363 and 361 DPs than did the ones like Steve Balboni, who couldn't throw the ball 90 feet without a cutoff man relaying it. Certainly many more seasonally than would be reflected in a +/- 2 runs. But I have nothing concrete to support that observation.

The Scouting Report, By the Fans, For the Fans - 1B Report (March 24, 2004)

Posted 10:39 a.m., March 25, 2004 (#9) - dlf
  Just curious: what is the basis for weighing the player who starts the DP equally with the pivot man? How much would the ratings change if the player who commences the play got 75%? Or if he got 25%?

I'm trying to follow the math. Runner on first, no outs, the run expectation is somewhere around 0.8 runs. If the 1B turns a 363 and there are no runners on, two outs, that expectation drops to roughly 0.1 runs. If the 1B gets the lead runner, its about 0.5; if he only gets the batter, its about 0.7. So for each 363 or 361 that is turned, the advantage is between 0.4 runs and 0.6 runs. Roughly similar numbers would apply with 1 out or runners at the corners. (I assume very few 363 / 361 turned when the runner at 1st isn't held on, i.e. when a runner is on 2nd as well.) At one half run per occurance, it would take less than one extra 363 or 361 DP per month to go right to the top of MGL's charts. Are there really that few 363 & 361 DPs?

The Scouting Report, By the Fans, For the Fans - 1B Report (March 24, 2004)

Posted 11:05 a.m., March 25, 2004 (#12) - dlf
  Tango,

I would take it a step further and look at 463 and 643 for each of the player combinations seperately. Similarly, to find the defensive value of the SS at turning two, look at the 543 DPs to help sort out how much of the value comes from the 2B. (I'm not sure if that is what you were saying by looking at A-Rod above; I interpreted it as looking at his performance historically as a SS, not tomorrow as a 3B.)

I have no data to back this up, but anecdotally, reading biographies and autobiographies of good defensive infielders, it almost always seems that they credit a quick and accurate throw to the pivot man as the key to turning two. My observation would reflect that as well - although I recognize that I may be seeing only what I expect to see having read all those Graig Nettles, Ozzie Smith, etc. articles and books.

Mo and the HOF (March 25, 2004)

Posted 2:51 p.m., March 25, 2004 (#7) - dlf
  Lets see, if you figure an average hall of fame career at 18 seasons, with three players being inducted every two seasons and one third of those being pitchers, there ought to be about nine HOF pitchers playing right now.

From 1990 to 2003, 52 individuals have been elected to the HoF. Thats about 3.7 per year, not 1.5. 12 of those were elected as managers, league officials or umpires. But even at 40 inductees, that is ~2.9 per year, almost twice your estimate.

Clemens, Maddux, Martinez, Johnson?, one of the A's, one of the Cubs, Rivera, one of the maybes (Mussina, Schilling, Brown, Smoltz...)

Not to argue for or against his merits, I think that absent a Rose-like revelation, Tom Glavine will walk into the Hall. 250 wins now, likely to finish ~275. 2 Cy Youngs. Part of a famous rotation. Incredibly amounts of post-season exposure.